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1. Introduction
Since 2012, EU citizens have been using the European Citizens’ Initiative
(ECI) to bring to the attention of the EU Institutions proposals on issues such
as the environment, employment, education, and culture.1 The proposals
brought forward are often contentious. One cannot but notice, for example, the
eye-catching themes of the four ECIs that have managed to collect the
necessary one million signatures: privatization of water services, financing of
research that involves human embryos, animal experimentation, and pesticide
use.2 The controversy surrounding citizens’ proposals is also evident in those
Initiatives that were refused registration by the Commission and thus never
made it to the signature collection phase. This list includes suggested
campaigns to abolish the European Parliament, and to stop Brexit.3 The list of
rejected Initiatives also includes the “One million signatures for ‘a Europe of
Solidarity’” Initiative (hereafter “the Solidarity Initiative”), which constituted
an attempt to introduce in EU law a so-called “state of necessity” principle,
according to which a Member State can refuse to repay its “abhorrent debt”
when its financial and political existence is threatened.4 The rejection by the
Commission of the Initiative in September 2012 left the Initiative’s organizers
with two main options besides withdrawing: to re-attempt registration after
1. Art. 11 TEU, Art. 24 TFEU, and the Regulation (EU) 211/2011 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 Feb. 2011 on the citizens’ initiative, O.J. 2011, L 65/1
(hereafter “ECI Regulation”). For examples of various ECIs and respective Commission letters
of refusal (Decisions) mentioned in this contribution, the reader is referred to the ECI website:
<www.ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/welcome> (all websites last visited 22 May
2019).
2. See respectively the ECIs “Right to Water”, “One of Us”, “Stop Vivisection”, and “Ban
glyphosate”.
3. See respectively the proposals “A new EU legal norm, self-abolition of the European
Parliament and its structures, must be immediately adopted”, and “British friends – stay with us
in EU”.
4. The Commission’s reply, stating the reasons for refusal of registration of the Solidarity
Initiative, is available at <ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/non-registered/de
tails/559>.
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modifying their proposal, and/or to challenge before the General Court the
Commission’s decision to refuse the ECI. The organizers chose to take direct
action against the Commission before the General Court. In November 2012,
Mr Anagnostakis, who was the Initiative’s designated representative, brought
an Article 263 TFEU challenge for judicial review of the Commission’s
decision to refuse registration of the Initiative. The General Court dismissed
the case in September 2015 and the applicant appealed the judgment before
the ECJ. The ECJ judgment, annotated here, is its first judgment on the ECI.5
Two areas of law, which at first sight are unrelated, are affected by the
judgment. The first is citizens’ participation in the EU specifically regarding
the Commission’s role in deciding whether proposed Initiatives should be
registered or not. The second is the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),
particularly the legal framework concerning financial assistance given to EU
Member States facing financial problems.The law pertaining to EMU is at the
heart of the proposal of the Solidarity Initiative, which is strongly linked to the
Greek debt crisis. With regard to the approach of the EU Courts vis-à-vis both
the ECI and EMU, this annotation argues that the judgment is not
revolutionary for either area.6 Yet the case itself is notable as it signalled for
the first time since the adoption of the ECI Regulation that the ECJ is ready to
engage in a review of both the process behind registering an ECI with the
Commission, and issues of substance pertaining to the legal competence of the
Commission to initiate legislation at the EU level.
2. Legal and factual background
The ECI is a participatory instrument that allows EU citizens to request the
Commission to consider an idea as a possible basis for a legislative proposal.
The organizers of an ECI have one year to collect one million signatures
supporting their idea for it to be considered by the Commission, which has
discretion as to how to respond. A basic description of the process behind the
registration of ECIs is necessary to understand the judgments of the EU
Courts.7 The first step in the process is to submit an ECI proposal to the
5. Case C-336/17 P,HB and Others v. European Commission, EU:C:2018:74, also reached
the ECJ; the appeal was dismissed as unfounded.The appeal alleged procedural irregularities in
the conduct of the oral hearing of the case before the General Court. More recently, the ECJ
annulled a Commission refusal to register an ECI, in Case C-420/16 P, Balázs-Árpád Izsák and
Attila Dabis, EU:C:2019:177.
6. In this annotation, the General Court and the Court of Justice together are referred to as
the EU Courts or sometimes simply the ECJ.
7. The legal framework of the ECI consists of Arts. 11(4) TEU, 24 TFEU, and the ECI
Regulation, which sets out the detailed procedure for bringing an ECI. For an up-to-date
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Commission for registration. If the Initiative is not registered, organizers
cannot start collecting signatures. According to Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI
Regulation, the Commission must refuse to register Initiatives proposing
action that “falls manifestly outside the framework of the Commission’s
powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of
implementing the Treaties”. This legal admissibility criterion is the only
ground on which the Commission has refused registration of proposed
Initiatives so far and the one relevant to the present contribution.8
From a procedural point of view, the organizers of a proposed Initiative
must submit to the Commission the information required by Annex II of the
ECI Regulation (Art. 4(2)(a)). Annex II requires the title, subject matter, and
objectives of the proposed Initiative, the Treaty provisions that organizers
consider relevant for their proposals, personal information of the organizers,
and the sources of funding at the time of the request for registration.
Organizers also have the option to submit a draft legal act supporting their
proposal. If the Commission refuses to register an ECI, it is obliged under
Article 4(3) of the ECI Regulation to inform the organizers of the reasons for
the refusal. According to the ECI Regulation, if the organizers of a rejected
Initiative disagree with the Commission Decision they can challenge it before
the EU Courts under an Article 263 TFEU action for judicial review.
The Solidarity Initiative was submitted to the Commission in July 2012. In
line with Annex II of the ECI Regulation, the organizers stipulated Articles
119–144 TFEU as potential legal bases for the adoption of the proposal. In
September 2012, the Commission informed the organizers that the Solidarity
Initiative was rejected because it did not fulfil the condition of Article 4(2)(b)
of the ECI Regulation, as it “fell manifestly outside the scope of the
Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for the adoption of a legal act of
the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaty”.
The Commission’s letter of refusal stated that the Commission had
examined the Treaty provisions mentioned in the proposed ECI, “and all other
possible legal bases”, before concluding that the proposal should be refused
analysis of all the ECI legal admissibility tests and all the relevant cases, see Karatzia,
“Revisiting the registration of European Citizens’ Initiatives: The evolution of the legal
admissibility test”, 20 CYELS (2018), 14. See also Organ, “Decommissioning direct
democracy? A critical analysis of Commission decision-making on the legal admissibility of
European Citizens’ Initiative proposals”, 10 EuConst (2014), 422; Athanasiadou, “The
European Citizens’ Initiative in times of Brexit”, 3 European Papers (2018), 1399; Inglese,
“European Citizens’ Initiatives, Greek debt and Court of Justice: The final chapter”, 3
European Papers (2018), 375.
8. Art. 4(2)(a)-(e) of the ECI Regulation provides three additional criteria that Initiatives
need to fulfil in order to be registered.
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registration.9 Of all the potential legal bases submitted by the organizers, only
Article 136(1) TFEU was specifically mentioned in the letter, where the
Commission explained in one paragraph why that Article could not be used as
the basis for the proposal. In October 2012, Mr Anagnostakis challenged the
refusal of the Solidarity Initiative. Before the General Court, he claimed that
the Commission mistakenly concluded that the proposal did not fulfil Article
4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation: the Commission should have registered the
proposed ECI based on Article 122(1), Article 122(2), Article 136(1)(b)
TFEU, and rules of international law. The General Court was asked not only to
annul the Decision, but also to order the Commission to register the proposed
Initiative, and order “any other measures required by law”.10 It dismissed the
action.
3. The judgment of the General Court and appeal to the ECJ
The admissibility of the applicant’s action to annul the Commission’s
Decision was not doubted by the Commission or the General Court (hereafter:
GC). The GC did consider, however, the admissibility of the second and third
heads of claim, with which, as mentioned above, the applicant requested the
Court to order the registration of the proposed ECI and any other measures
required by law.11 Referring to well-established case law,12 the GC explained
that it is not entitled to issue orders to the EU Institutions. Cases that concern
the ECI are no exception, so the GC found these heads of claim inadmissible.
Before examining the substance of the remaining claim, the GC decided on
its own motion to consider whether the Commission’s Decision satisfied the
requirement to state reasons, given the brevity of the statement that was sent to
the organizers of the Solidarity Initiative.13 The Court started by noting the
EU Institutions’ duty under Article 296 TFEU to state the reasons for their
decisions. It specified that, in the context of the ECI, this duty is given
expression by Article 4(3) of the ECI Regulation, which requires the
Commission to inform the organizers of the reasons for the refusal to register
their proposed Initiative.
9. Commission’s reply stating the reasons for refusal of registration of the Solidarity
Initiative, cited supra note 4.
10. Case T-450/12, Anagnostakis v. Commission, EU:T:2015:739, paras. 6–8. The case
does not specify what those measures might be.
11. Ibid., paras. 11–13.
12. Case T-204/99, Mattila v. Council and Commission, EU:T:2001:190; Case C-63/89,
Assurances du credit v. Council and Commission, EU:C:1991:152, para 30.
13. Case T-450/12, Anagnostakis, paras. 20–34.
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Reiterating that the assessment of the statement of reasons must take place
in light of the wording and the context of each case, the GC then made some
specific observations concerning the ECI. It is notable that the Court
grounded its analysis on the notion of the ECI as a citizens’ right under Article
24 TFEU. According to the Court, the refusal to register a proposed Initiative
is “an action that may impinge upon the very effectiveness of the right of
Union citizens to submit a citizens’ initiative”.14 A Commission’s refusal
renders citizens unable to effectively exercise their Treaty rights, hence the
Commission has a duty to appraise a proposed Initiative and give clear
grounds justifying its refusal to register it.
The GC found that the Commission had fulfilled its duty to state reasons. It
looked both at whether the Commission explained the reasons that justified its
refusal to register the Solidarity Initiative, and whether the reasons given were
extensive enough. With regard to the former, the Court was satisfied by the
fact that the Commission specified that it rejected the Initiative because it did
not fulfil the condition of Article 4(2)(b), as there were no legal bases
conferring competence on the Commission to propose an act that would
enable the attainment of the proposed Initiative’s objective.15 In considering
the extent of the obligation to state reasons, the GC paid particular attention to
the context of the Commission’s decision.16 The proposed Initiative only
referred in an unclear and general manner to 26 Treaty articles relating to
EMU, without stipulating how the articles were connected with the content of
the proposal.As such, the Commission was justified for not analysing in detail
all the Treaty provisions mentioned while specifically referring only to
Article 136(1) TFEU, which appeared to be “the least irrelevant” to the
proposed Initiative.
After examining the procedural ground of giving reasons, the Court moved
on to the substance of the case and considered whether the Commission
infringed Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation. The applicant argued that the
Commission infringed Articles 122(1) TFEU, 122(2) TFEU, 136(1)(b) TFEU,
and rules of international law in refusing to register the Initiative.17 Before
discussing each argument and the GC’s response individually, it should be
noted from the outset that the GC delivered its judgment on the understanding
that the proposed Initiative had suggested the establishment of a principle of a
state of necessity that would entitle a Member State to unilaterally decide not
to repay all or part of its debt because of severe financing problems.18 As will
14. Ibid., para 25.
15. Ibid., paras. 28–29.
16. Ibid., paras. 30–34.
17. Ibid., paras. 35–67.
18. Ibid., paras. 43, 50, 57.
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be seen later, the issue of the unilateral nature of the Member State’s action
reappeared when the case was appealed to the ECJ.
The GC first examined whether Article 122(1) TFEU could have been an
appropriate legal basis for the proposed ECI. Article 122(1) TFEU allows the
Council to decide, “in a spirit of solidarity between Member States”, upon
measures appropriate to the economic situation of a Member State, especially
if the Member State is facing severe difficulties in the supply of certain
products in the area of energy.The applicant’s argument was that the proposed
measure “would help to rehabilitate Member States affected by an excessive
debt burden and in position of economic need”.19 The applicant referred in the
abstract to a principle of “institutional solidarity”, which was allegedly
embodied in Article 122(1) TFEU and arose from “the moral and legal duty of
the Member States to provide mutual support and assistance to one another”.20
The GC dismissed the applicant’s argument. Referring to Pringle21, the
Court stated that Article 122(1) TFEU is not an appropriate legal basis to
establish a funding mechanism that provides financial assistance to Member
States who are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing
problems.22 Most importantly, it noted that Article 122(1) TFEU concerns
measures that result from assistance between Member States. As such, the
provision cannot be used as the legal basis for the adoption of legislation, such
as that proposed by the applicant, which would allow a Member State
unilaterally to decide not to repay its debt.23
Subsequently, the GC also dismissed the applicant’s argument that the
Commission should have registered the Initiative based on Article 122(2)
TFEU.24 That provision allows the Council to authorize financial assistance
from the EU to a Member State which is experiencing severe difficulties, or a
serious threat of severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional
circumstances beyond the Member State’s control. The Court referred once
again to Pringle. First, the ECJ in Pringle interpreted Article 122(2) TFEU as
allowing the EU to grant ad hoc financial assistance to a Member State subject
to strict conditionality.25 A general and permanent mechanism that would
allow the abandonment by a Member State of its debt, such as that suggested
by the Solidarity Initiative, cannot be established based on that provision.
Secondly, Article 122(2) TFEU concerns only financial assistance granted by
19. Ibid., para 36.
20. Ibid., para 38.
21. Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:756, paras. 115–116.
22. Case T-450/12, Anagnostakis, para 41.
23. Ibid., paras. 42–43.
24. Ibid., paras. 45–51.
25. Case C-370/12, Pringle, paras. 65, 104, 131.
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the EU, and not that granted by the Member States.26 The measure suggested
in the Solidarity Initiative covered debts owed by a Member State to the EU,
and debts owed by a Member State to natural or legal, public or private,
persons. Hence, if one were to perceive the applicant’s proposal as financial
assistance, this would not be covered by Article 122(2) TFEU given that the
EU cannot write off debt that is not owed to it.27
The next argument of the applicant, which was also dismissed by the Court,
was that the proposed Initiative should have been registered based on Article
136(1)(b) TFEU.28 In the statement of reasons, the Commission had explained
that Article 136(1) TFEU can only be used as a legal basis for measures that
strengthen the budgetary discipline of the Member States and aim to
contribute to the proper functioning of the EMU. The provision does not allow
the Union to substitute the Member States in the exercise of their budgetary
sovereignty or in carrying out functions related to State income and
expenditure.29
The applicant contested the Commission’s position. He submitted that the
principle of necessity can be introduced as an economic policy guideline in
line with Article 136(1)(b) TFEU because “it contributes to the coordination
and harmonization of the economic policies of the Member States with regard
to States which find themselves in a state of need”.30 He also maintained that
through the procedures provided in Articles 122–126 TFEU, the Council is
entitled to take measures beyond those designed to reinforce budgetary
discipline and hence measures impinging on a Member State’s budgetary
sovereignty. To say that the Council cannot take such measures would be
contrary to the solidarity clause in Article 222 TFEU, which allows “for joint
action on the part of the Member States in the event of a natural or a man-made
catastrophe as has befallen Greece”.31
In examining the applicant’s claims, the Court noted that he had not
demonstrated how the adoption of the principle of the state of necessity would
help in coordinating budgetary discipline or could be considered an economic
policy guideline under Article 136 TFEU.32 Referring for the last time to
Pringle, the Court emphasized that, when it comes to economic policy, the
Union can only adopt coordinating measures. Allowing the adoption of a
legislative act that authorizes a Member State not to repay its debt is not only
outside the meaning of Article 136(1)(b) TFEU; it would also “result in
26. Case T-450/12, Anagnostakis, para 49; Case C-370/12, Pringle, para 118.
27. Case T-450/12, Anagnostakis, para 50.
28. Ibid., paras. 52–61.
29. Commission’s reply stating the reasons for refusal of registration, cited supra note 4.
30. Case T-450/12, Anagnostakis, para 53.
31. Ibid., para 54.
32. Ibid., para 57.
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replacing the free will of contracting parties with a legislative mechanism for
the unilateral writing-off of sovereign debt, which is something that the
provision clearly does not authorize”.33 The GC then briefly stated that there
is no inconsistency between the Commission’s reply and Article 222 TFEU
because that Article is irrelevant to the EMU and does not cover the budgetary
difficulties of the Member States.
The applicant’s last argument was based on international law.34 The
applicant argued that the principle of the state of necessity was a rule of
international law, which was recognized in the case law of the International
Court of Justice. It allowed for the unilateral writing-off of part of a sovereign
debt for economic reasons. In its judgment, the GC did not consider at all the
existence or the nature of such a rule of international law or whether this
would allow a Member State to refuse to repay its sovereign debt in
exceptional circumstances. It merely noted that, in any case, international law
cannot constitute a basis for a legislative proposal by the Commission in the
absence of any corresponding conferral of powers in the Treaties.35
The subsequent appeal to the ECJ is rather confusing. It naturally requests
the ECJ to set aside the judgment of the GC, but it also asks it to order the
Commission to register the Solidarity Initiative, although the GC explicitly
stated that the EU Courts are unable to oblige EU institutions to act in a
specific way. The appeal was based on two main arguments. First, the
appellant argued that the GC misunderstood the subject matter of the
proposed Initiative: the GC overlooked that the Initiative proposal did not
concern the entire debt of a Member State, but only “that part of the public
debt which is considered ‘abhorrent’”. The text of the appeal, however, did not
define the term “abhorrent debt”.
Secondly, the applicant argued that the GC infringed, misinterpreted, and
misapplied EU law.36 This ground of appeal consisted of six more detailed
arguments. Some of these referred to Treaty provisions that had not been
mentioned in the case before the GC. To follow the same order as our
discussion of the GC’s judgment above, we can re-group the arguments of the
appeal to match the three main arguments in the first instance case concerning
Articles 122 and 136 TFEU and rules of international law. Regarding Article
122 TFEU, the appellant argued that the GC mistakenly ruled out the use of
33. Ibid., paras. 58–60.
34. Ibid., paras. 62–67.
35. Ibid., para 65.
36. In the words of the appeal, the ground here was “Infringement of EU law by the General
Court, misinterpretation and misapplication of the Treaties and of European legislation”. For
the arguments of the appeal discussed here, see Case C-589/15: Appeal by Alexios
Anagnostakis against the judgment delivered by the General Court in Case T-450/12,
Anagnostakis, O.J. 2016, C 7/12.
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this provision as an appropriate legal basis, because the Commission can
submit a proposal to the Council under Article 352 TFEU to recommend that
assistance be given under Article 122(1) or 122(2)TFEU to a Member State in
serious difficulties. If nothing else, the Commission itself has the power to
establish a financial assistance mechanism under Article 352 TFEU to attain
stability in the euro area, something the GC ignored. The reference to Article
352 TFEU is notable because the case before the GC had not referred to this
provision at all.
Concerning Article 136 TFEU, the appeal stated that this Treaty provision
gives an absolute power to the Eurozone Member States to establish “a
stability mechanism and of financial assistance” (sic). However, while the
case before the GC had only mentioned Article 136(1) TFEU, the appeal
referred to “Article 136 TFEU as amended by the European Council Decision
2011/199/EU”. The addition of this note to the text of the appeal can be seen
as a reference to Article 136(3) TFEU, although Article 136(3) TFEU is not
explicitly mentioned. The appellant also argued that the GC mistakenly found
that the principle of the state of necessity could not strengthen the
coordination of budgetary discipline or be seen as an economic policy
guideline under Article 136(1) TFEU. In fact, the applicant asserted that the
non-payment of the abhorrent debt, which would be allowed by the proposed
principle of the state of necessity, “is designed exclusively to strengthen the
budgetary discipline of the Member States”.
With reference to the use of international law for the purposes of registering
the Solidarity Initiative, the appellant argued that the GC wrongly found that
international law could not constitute a legal basis for the adoption of EU law.
Since international law is a source of law for the EU, the argument goes, there
is no need for a more specific provision in the Treaty to allow the Commission
to propose legislation coming from international law. The final point of the
appeal that is of interest to this annotation concerned the alleged inadequacy
of the Commission’s statement of reasons.
4. Opinion ofAdvocate General Mengozzi
Advocate General Mengozzi re-organized the appeal in four grounds, which
he classified into two groups. The first group of arguments relate to the
procedure with which the Commission made its decision, and particularly the
adequacy of the Commission’s reasons. The second group concerns the
assessment by the GC of the substance of the contested decision and thus of
the legality of the Commission’s application of Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI
Regulation. This group includes the appellant’s complaints about the
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misinterpretation by the GC of Articles 122 and 136 TFEU and rules of
international law.
Starting with the claim regarding the reasons given by the Commission to
the ECI organizers, the Advocate General emphasized that the Commission
should demonstrate a very explanatory approach when replying to Initiative
organizers, since these persons are not necessarily experienced in EU law.37
Yet the responsibility of the Commission does not go as far as to oblige the
Commission to explain “the reasons why no provision of the Treaties can form
the basis for Union action”.38 For the Advocate General, this limitation to the
Commission’s obligation to give reasons stems inter alia from the lack of
precision of the proposed Initiative itself. The vagueness of a proposed
Initiative affects the ability of the Commission to assess a proposal; the
Commission cannot be expected to specify points of law that might not have
been envisaged by the authors of the Initiative. Besides, the real question here
should be whether the addressee was able to understand the reasons for the
rejection of his application.39
For the Advocate General, it was clear in the statement of reasons that the
proposed Initiative was rejected because it did not comply with Article 4(2)(b)
of the ECI Regulation. It was also clear from the judgment under appeal that
the General Court applied the correct test in assessing the Commission’s
statement of reasons. With regard to the appellant’s argument that the
complexity of the law on the EMU should be taken into consideration, the
Advocate General considered this issue as something that should arise under
the review of the substance of the Commission’s Decision, and not under the
procedural consideration of the adequacy of the Commission’s reasons,
because it relates to the interpretation of the Treaty provisions mentioned in
the ECI. The argument on the complexity of the area covering the ECI in
question did not reappear in the ECJ’s judgment.
After dismissing the first group of arguments (i.e. on procedural grounds),
the Advocate General considered whether the reasoning of the contested
decision was well founded. He emphasized that the purpose of the proposed
Initiative and the references to Articles 119 to 144 TFEU were the only
information available to the Commission at the time of the assessment,
although further details about the proposal were submitted to the Court by the
applicant in the appeal case. The Advocate General attempted to put together
the additional information in order to decipher the specific objectives of the
proposed ECI. Based on the text of the appeal, he described the Solidarity
37. Opinion, para 24.
38. Ibid., para 25.
39. Ibid., paras. 25–27.
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Initiative as follows:40 the proposed Initiative relates only to the “abhorrent”
part of a sovereign debt, and not the entire amount of the sovereign debt. The
recommended “principle of the state of necessity” would allow the
cancellation of a State’s abhorrent debt towards other Member States and the
Union, but would not be considered a financing mechanism or one that is
related to stability.41 The application of the principle of the state of necessity
would be triggered upon request of a Member State whose debt threatens the
economic and political situation in the country, and upon agreement from the
rest of the Member States and the Union. The use of the principle of the state
of necessity would be open to all Member States, but its application would be
subject to strict conditions and to approval by the Union, which would also be
responsible for approving a Member State’s declaration of the state of
necessity. Notably, the picture of the proposal as described by the Advocate
General is what emerged from the explanation given by the appellant during
the appeal case, but not necessarily at the time of the registration, when the
Commission had much more limited information about the specifics of the
Solidarity Initiative.
The Advocate General agreed with the General Court’s findings on
Articles 122 and 136 TFEU. Concerning Article 122 TFEU, the Advocate
General opined that, based on Pringle, the provision at hand could not be a
legal basis for the establishment of a principle of the state of necessity, even if
one assumed that the principle of the state of necessity was covered by the term
“appropriate measures” stated in Article 122(1) TFEU.42 At the very least, the
proposed mechanism would be of a general and permanent nature, while
Article 122(1) TFEU only allows for ad hoc measures. Moreover, the
proposed Initiative would not fulfil the condition of Article 122 TFEU that
financial assistance must be granted by the Union and not by the Member
States.43 The Advocate General found some interest in the appellant’s
proposition that the Commission could have partially acted on the proposal to
register only the part concerning the debt owed by a Member State to the
Union. Nonetheless, he did not delve into this argument because the appellant
had not substantiated it as a ground of appeal.
40. The description here aims to put together the information given by the A.G. in para 31
of the Opinion.
41. Even though at one point the appellant also asserted that the principle of the state of
necessity would only cover the debt of a Member State vis-à-vis the Union.
42. In para 116 of Case 270/12, Pringle, the Court ruled that Art. 122(1) TFEU: “does not
constitute an appropriate legal basis for any financial assistance from the Union to Member
States who are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems”.
43. Opinion, para 43.
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Subsequently, the Advocate General examined the appellant’s argument
that the General Court misinterpreted Article 136 TFEU.44 He sided with the
Commission’s view that the argument on using Article 352 in conjunction
with Article 136(3)TFEU as a legal basis for the Initiative was inadmissible as
it was only introduced at the appeal stage.
The Advocate General also highlighted some inconsistencies in the
appellant’s arguments. For instance, the appellant argued that the principle of
the state of necessity would apply to all the EU Member States and would not
cover financial stability, even though Article 136(1) TFEU clearly applies
only to Eurozone countries and Article 136(3) TFEU is a legal basis for the
establishment of a stability mechanism.45 In addition, the Advocate General
observed that the proposed Initiative was submitted to the Commission in July
2012, whilst Article 136(3) TFEU was introduced in the Treaty in May 2013.
As such, he opined that the argument on that provision was inadmissible, as
the appellant could not have considered Article 136(3) TFEU as a legal basis
for the Solidarity Initiative nor relied on it retrospectively.46
Finally, the Advocate General stated that there was no reason for the
General Court to express a view on whether there is a principle of the state of
necessity in international law.47 This issue was irrelevant to the case at hand
because the only sources that set out and delineate EU competences are the
Treaties in accordance with the principle of conferral (Art. 5 TEU). The
Advocate General opined that this complaint should be rejected as unfounded,
and the appeal in its entirety should be dismissed.
5. Judgment of the Court of Justice
The ECJ dismissed the appeal and largely followed the Advocate General’s
Opinion. Like the Advocate General, the ECJ classified the complaint under
four grounds of appeal; the first related to the adequacy of the reasons given by
the Commission, and the others relating to the rationale behind the General
Court’s decision that neither Articles 122 and 136 TFEU, nor rules of
international law, could be used as legal bases for the proposed Initiative.
The ECJ commenced with some preliminary observations about the ECI
itself.48 It confirmed that the Commission’s obligation under Article 4(3) of
44. Ibid., paras. 45–56.
45. Ibid., para 50.
46. Ibid., paras. 53–56.
47. Ibid., paras. 57–63.
48. Judgment, paras. 24–28.
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the ECI Regulation derives from, and is a specific expression of, the obligation
on EU institutions to state reasons under Article 296 TFEU. Similarly to the
General Court, the ECJ reiterated well-established case law on Article 296
TFEU, according to which the requirements of that Article “must be assessed
with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal
rules governing the matter in question”.49 It also highlighted that the
Commission statement rejecting an ECI must include both the applicable
Article of the Regulation (e.g. Art. 4(2)(b)) and the reasons why the proposal
does not comply with that Article. The ECJ confirmed the finding of the
General Court that the Commission fulfilled its duty to state reasons.
With regard to the appellant’s argument on the use ofArticle 122 TFEU, the
ECJ reiterated the GC’s finding, which had relied on Pringle, that Article
122(1) TFEU is not an appropriate legal basis for financial assistance from the
EU to Member States threatened by financial problems.50 This finding was
clear enough not to be affected by the factual differences between the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was the subject of Pringle, and
the proposed Initiative.51 The finding that a Member State cannot use Article
122(1) TFEU to decide unilaterally not to repay all or part of its debt is also
unaffected by any considerations of solidarity between Member States.52
Concerning the use of Article 122(2) TFEU as a potential legal basis for the
proposed Initiative, the ECJ once again agreed with the findings of the GC: the
general and permanent nature of the mechanism for the non-repayment of debt
rendered Article 122(2) TFEU inapplicable to the proposed Initiative.53
Moreover, the ECJ highlighted the fact that the state of necessity could not be
considered a measure of “assistance granted by the Union” in the context of
Article 122(2) TFEU, because it aimed to cover debts owed by Member States
both to the EU and to other natural or legal persons.54
The next ground of appeal related to the interpretation of Article 136(1)
TFEU where once again the ECJ confirmed the GC’s finding on the
unsuitability of Article 136(1) TFEU as a legal basis for the registration of the
Solidarity Initiative. The proposed Initiative cannot be seen as “economic
policy guidance” under Article 136(1)(b) TFEU. On the contrary, the
mechanism proposed by the Solidarity Initiative would “in fact result in
replacing the free will of contracting parties with a legislative mechanism for
49. Ibid., para 29.
50. Ibid., para 69.
51. Ibid., paras. 70–71.
52. Ibid., para 71.
53. Ibid., para 75.
54. Ibid., para 77.
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the unilateral writing-off of sovereign debt”.55 The ECJ then shortly noted that
it was unable to examine the appellant’s argument on the potential use of
Article 136(3) TFEU as a legal basis for the Initiative, because it was raised
only in the appeal.56
The last part of the judgment dealt with the appellant’s argument that the
GC wrongly found that a principle of international law, such as that of the state
of necessity, could not be a legal basis for a legislative initiative by the
Commission.57 Referring to Articles 5(1), 5(2), and 13 TEU, the ECJ
emphasized that the Commission can propose a legal act only based on a
competence conferred on the Union by the Treaties and not on the existence of
a principle of international law, such as the alleged principle of the state of
necessity.58 As such, there was no need to examine whether such a principle
exists at all under international law.59
6. Commentary
As mentioned above, the judgments of both the GC and the ECJ are split into
two main parts: a part discussing the Commission’s duty to give reasons, and
a part examining the merits of the Commission’s decision to reject the
proposed Initiative. These comments are roughly divided along similar lines.
First, they discuss issues arising from the case which concern the procedure
pertaining to the ECI. They decipher the ECJ’s approach to questions relating
to the character of the ECI and illustrate the Court’s interpretation of the legal
admissibility test and more specifically Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation
in the context of this particular case. Secondly, the commentary examines the
substantive implications of the judgment for the EMU. It argues that, despite
initial commentary, the EU Courts did not use “explosive language”60 when
considering the question of a possible “haircut” of a country’s sovereign debt
(i.e. debt relief).61 If anything, the ECJ was careful not to give too much away
when it comes to the Treaty legal bases allowing for financial assistance to a
Member State.
55. Ibid., paras. 90–91.
56. Ibid., para 93.
57. Ibid., paras. 95–103.
58. Ibid., para 100.
59. Ibid., para 101.
60. Sarmiento, “The European Citizens’ Initiative and EU competence over Greek debt
‘haircuts’”, EU Law Analysis (8 Oct. 2015), <eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/10/the-
european-citizens-initiative-and-eu.html>.
61. For a discussion of the Greek debt and debt relief see Hofmann, “Greek debt relief ”, 37
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2017), 1.
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6.1. Implications of the judgment for the ECI as a participatory
mechanism
To begin with, it is notable that the GC chose to examine of its own motion the
Commission’s duty to give reasons. In this way, the GC created the space to
make declarations on the purpose and character of the ECI vis-à-vis Article 11
TFEU, Article 24 TFEU, and the ECI Regulation. For instance, the GC talked
about the connection between the right to bring an ECI and EU citizenship.62
Such statements might not have been possible at the point where the GC
looked at the substance of the case where, as is shown below, issues
concerning the interpretation of the proposed legal bases for an Initiative
mainly revolved around competence delimitation and the principle of
conferral in the context of the EMU.
The standpoint from which the GC examined the Commission’s duty to
give reasons is worth commenting on, as it is grounded on a perception of the
ECI as a “right of citizens to participate” in the EU democratic life. The GC
referred to “the right of Union citizens to submit a citizens’ initiative”, which
is enshrined in Article 24(1) TFEU and which was intended to reinforce EU
citizenship and to promote the participation of citizens in the democratic life
of the EU, hence enhancing the democratic functioning of the Union.63 From
this starting point, the GC stated that the rejection of a proposed Initiative has
the potential to impede the effective exercise of the Treaty-bestowed right to
submit an ECI. Consequently, the Commission should carefully appraise a
proposed Initiative and give reasons if it refuses to register it. The ECJ
judgment confirms this interpretation by referring to “the right to submit an
ECI as an instrument of citizen participation in the democratic life of the
European Union”.64
Two issues connected with the appraisals of the Commission’s duty to give
reasons are worth further comments. First, the GC’s choice to review of its
own motion the reasons given by the Commission for rejecting the proposed
Initiative can be seen as a warning signal to the Commission. Since
Anagnostakiswas the first case on the ECI, it is likely that the GC saw it as an
opportunity to pass a message to the Commission about the level of scrutiny
that the latter institution should expect on its decision to reject an Initiative. If
this is so, the strength of the message is rather questionable, given that the EU
Courts simply repeated the traditional test for the duty of the EU institutions to
62. Case T-450/12, Anagnostakis, paras. 25–26.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., para 49, para 24, para 30. The ECJ also referred to the ECI as a citizens’ right –
although less enthusiastically – in para 48.
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give reasons for their decisions. There is nothing in the judgment to
distinguish the duty of the Commission to give reasons in the context of the
ECI from other cases, despite the novel nature of the case and the explicit
acknowledgment that the ECI bestows a “right” on EU citizens. Having said
that, the ECJ also confirmed that the Commission is obliged to consider all the
information submitted by an organizer in accordance with the process
stipulated in the ECI Regulation. For instance, in situations where the
organizers of a proposed Initiative submit an annex to their proposal with
detailed information on the subject, objectives, and background to the
proposal, the Commission must examine that information in addition to the
mandatory information submitted by the organizers.65
This takes us to the second observation about the GC’s review of the
Commission’s duty to give reasons: the judgment in Anagnostakis should
serve as a reminder both to the Commission and to potential ECI organizers
that there are safeguards in the process of registering (or refusing) an
Initiative.66 The potential for the GC to interfere and set things straight
regarding the Commission’s reasons for rejecting an ECI has the capacity to
change the future of a proposed ECI. Think here, for example, of theMinority
SafePack Initiative, which was originally refused registration by the
Commission. When the organizers challenged the legality of the refusal, the
GC ordered the annulment of the Commission’s decision on the grounds that
the Commission did not comply with its duty to give reasons.67 As a response,
the Commission (partially) registered that ECI.
In a more indirect way than overturning the fate of a proposed Initiative, the
potential for interference by the GC or the ECJ may lead to more careful
examination by the Commission of proposed Initiatives and to more detailed
explanations when proposed ECIs are rejected. This possibility holds true
regardless of the actual outcome of Anagnostakis or of most ECI cases, where
the GC found that the Commission complied with its duty to give reasons. The
Commission has recently changed the way it informs citizens of its decision to
reject a proposed Initiative and it now publishes more detailed decisions both
for rejected and for registered ECIs.68 Although the Commission has not
directly linked this change to ECI litigation, the change in the Commission’s
practice may be seen as an indication of how the EU Courts’ judgments have
influenced the Commission’s approach in practice.
65. Judgment, paras. 34–35.
66. See also Vogiatzis, “Between discretion and control: Reflections on the institutional
position of the Commission within the European Citizens’ Initiative process”, 23 ELJ (2017),
250.
67. Case T-646/13, Minority SafePack v. Commission, EU:T:2017:59.
68. See Karatzia, op. cit. supra note 7.
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Taken together, the Commission’s duty to give reasons, the possible
external scrutiny by the EU Courts of the Commission’s admissibility
decisions, and the Commission’s response to the judgments, all mandate a
careful approach towards recent suggestions to place the ECI legal
admissibility decisions in the hands of an independent third party.69 During a
recent hearing at the European Parliament on the reform of the ECI
Regulation, it was argued that an independent third party with the appropriate
expertise in EU law should be given responsibility for deciding on the
admissibility of ECIs. The merit of this suggestion was that this independent
party would eliminate the dual role of the Commission as a decision-maker
both at the admissibility stage and the final stage of an ECI’s life. If it were to
materialize, this reform might lead to more problems than the ones it tries to
solve. Leaving aside the questions of who would bear this responsibility and
how their qualifications would be checked, this reform would lead to the loss
of a valuable platform to scrutinize not only the final decisions but also the
decision-making process pertaining to the ECI’s legal admissibility stage.
Currently, that platform is available to ECI organizers through the process of
judicial review under Article 263 TFEU. Moving the responsibility for the
ECI admissibility test from the Commission to another body or individual in
the future would mean that the EU Courts would no longer have the power to
scrutinize the application of Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation in case of
disagreement between the organizers and the decision-maker.
On a different note – and moving away from the particulars of the duty to
give reasons – Anagnostakis has also squarely contextualized the ECI as an
instrument linked to EU citizenship. A close look at Article 24(1) TFEU
shows that the language of that provision differs from the rest of Article 24
TFEU. While Article 24(2), (3), and (4) explicitly mention that “every citizen
of the Union” should be able to take advantage of ways to interact with EU
institutions,70 Article 24(1) TFEU is a legal basis for the adoption of
secondary legislation setting out the detailed legal framework for the ECI. It is
the Preamble to the ECI Regulation that explicitly makes the link between the
ECI and EU citizenship which is now recognized by the EU Courts in
Anagnostakis.
The ECJ’s approach to the case through the lens of “citizenship rights”
raises the question of what the implications are of this approach for the ECI’s
justiciability. What are the implications of proclaiming that citizens have a
69. The suggestion was made during the hearing organized by AFCO and PETI Committee
at the European Parliament on the Revision of the ECI Regulation, 21 Feb. 2018.
70. Art. 24 provides for the right to petition the European Parliament, the possibility to
apply to the Ombudsman, and the option to write to the EU institutions and receive a reply in
your language of choice.
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“right to undertake an ECI” which allows them “to apply directly to the
Commission in order to submit to it a request inviting it to submit a proposal
for a legal act of the Union, for the purposes of the application of the
Treaties”?71Anagnostakis hints at the fact that the “right” to undertake an ECI
is confined to the right to submit an ECI, and not necessarily a right to have
your ECI acted upon by the Commission, or acted upon by the EU institutions.
The issue of “what type of right” the ECI bestows on EU citizens is in turn
linked to a question regarding the justiciability of the ECI: would the ECJ be
equally willing to interfere with the Commission’s decisions at the follow-up
stage as with its decisions at the admissibility stage? Anagnostakis was the
first to confirm the admissibility of cases contesting the Commission’s
interpretation and application of Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation. The
Commission enjoys considerably more discretion when it comes to its final
decision on a successfully submitted ECI than with regard to admissibility.
The recent GC judgment in One of Us illustrates that the EU Courts are also
ready to step in when it comes to cases challenging the Commission’s final
decisions on successfully submitted ECIs, though to a lesser extent.72 In One
ofUs, for instance, the GC examined whether the Commission had fulfilled its
procedural duty to give reasons, but only conducted a limited review of the
applicants’ argument that the Commission’s assessment of the ECI was
mistaken.
A final, brief comment on the part of the judgment dealing with the
procedural aspect of the ECI concerns a point that was only dealt with in
passing by Advocate General Mengozzi and the ECJ: the possibility for
partial registration of an ECI.73 The phrase “partial registration” refers to the
possibility for the Commission to register only some parts of a proposed
Initiative, which would fulfil the ECI admissibility test. As we have seen
above, both Advocate General Mengozzi and the ECJ dismissed the argument
on partial registration of the Solidarity Initiative because it was only presented
in the appeal case. The recently voted New ECI Regulation will formally
recognize the ability of the Commission to partially register an Initiative “if
part of the initiative, including its main objectives, does not manifestly fall
outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a
legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties”.74
71. Judgment, para 24.
72. Case T-561/14, One of Us and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2018:210.
73. Opinion, para 44; judgment, para 79.
74. Art. 6(3)(c) European Parliament and European Council Brussels, Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the European Citizens’ Initiative, 2017/0220 (COD)
PE-CONS 92/18, 27 March 2019.
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6.2. Anagnostakis in the context of the EMU
Despite its outcome, Anagnostakis revives a debate that was at the forefront of
discussions during the peak of the euro-crisis, namely the relationship
between the notion of “solidarity” and the financial assistance given to
Member States facing financial problems. We recall here the landmark cases
ofPringle andGauweiler,75 which contested the legality of crisis management
measures taken by the EU Member States and by the European Central Bank
respectively. It was acknowledged at the time that solidarity worked at the
background of the legal developments: some sort of “de facto” solidarity was
apparent in the behaviour of the relevant actors.76 Solidarity, therefore, was
discussed as a concept linked to financial obligations and has been identified
as a principle, a value, or an objective of EU law which is linked to sharing
financial obligations and which needs to be balanced carefully with the risk of
moral hazard.77
Yet the legal meaning and implications of the notion of solidarity in the
context of the EMU were not analysed by the EU Courts in the two cases
mentioned above or in subsequent litigation. The most explicit reference to
solidarity was made by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion in Pringle,
regarding the interpretation of Article 125 TFEU (i.e. the no bail-out
clause).78 The Advocate General opined that “a broad interpretation of Article
125 TFEU would be incompatible with the concept of solidarity” but the
concept of solidarity does not create a duty to provide financial assistance to
a Member State.79 Beyond the Advocate General’s statement, the concept of
solidarity hardly featured in the EMU-related case law.
It is in this context that the relevance ofAnagnostakis to EMU law should be
placed, insofar as it seems that the applicant was trying to rely on a notion of
“solidarity” – generally speaking – to propose a “haircut” of the Greek
sovereign debt. The applicant refers to the notion of “the principle of
necessity” which he presents as a specific expression of solidarity in his
75. Case C-62/14, Peter Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, EU:C:2015:400.
For commentary see De Witte and Beukers, “The Court of Justice approves the creation of the
European Stability Mechanism outside the EU legal order: Pringle”, 50 CML Rev. (2013), 805;
Craig and Markakis, “Gauweiler and the legality of outright monetary transactions”, 41 EL
Rev. (2016), 1.
76. Borger, “How the debt crisis exposes the development of solidarity in the euro area”, 9
EUConst (2013), 7; McDonnell, “Solidarity, flexibility, and the euro-crisis: Where do
principles fit in?”, in Rossi and Casolari (Eds.), The EU after Lisbon:Amending or Coping with
the Existing Treaties? (Springer, 2014).
77. McDonnell, op. cit. supra note 76.
78. Opinion of A.G. Kokott on Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:675.
79. Ibid., paras. 142–143.
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proposed Initiative.80 The EU Courts were thus called to rule on the existence
of a legal basis for a proposed Initiative that relied, broadly speaking, on the
notion of solidarity and attempted to influence EMU law through that notion.
In principle, therefore, the case could be seen as an opportunity for the ECJ to
give its own understanding of the notion of solidarity in the context of
financial assistance to Eurozone Member States, and perhaps to clarify what
was left unsaid in Pringle and Gauweiler. Yet, as can be seen from this
commentary and as further discussed below, the ECJ did not add anything
substantial to the discussion on the relevance of solidarity in this context, but
mostly reiterated its judgment in Pringle vis-à-vis the specific content of the
case at hand.
It can be said that the analysis of a case that challenges a Commission
decision under the ECI Regulation is perhaps not the most appropriate
platform to draw conclusions regarding the legal bases that allow or prohibit
financial assistance to Eurozone Member States. The Anagnostakis case itself
does not directly relate to the functioning of a specific mechanism of financial
assistance, which was, for instance, the focus of the cases on the Cyprus
haircut of deposits, and neither is it a preliminary request from a Member State
court questioning assistance mechanisms, like older Portuguese cases.81
There is something peculiar in considering an ECI case vis-à-vis the EMU,
which is a rather technical area that remained for several years outside the
concern of the EU Courts.
However, a significant factor links the case with the EMU, allowing us to
comment on it from the perspective of the EMU: Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI
Regulation goes to the core of EU competence delimitation, as it pertains to
the Commission’s competence to propose legislation. In this sense, a
judgment on whether the Commission correctly refused an ECI on substantive
grounds can potentially have far-reaching implications that go beyond the
semantics of admissibility of a specific ECI. This possibility holds true even
though in Anagnostakis, the judgment was rather predictable and offered little
more than we already knew about the operation of financial assistance
mechanisms and the link with the concept of solidarity.
Two factors might explain the ECJ’s cautious approach to the case. The first
is the peculiarity noted here, viz. the EU Courts being asked to deliver an
EMU-related judgment in a case that was not directly relevant to the
80. For an analysis of necessity as acknowledging in EU law the right of Member States to
act in contravention of the EU rules, see Koutrakos, “The notion of necessity in the Law of the
European Union”, 41 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2010), 193.
81. See respectively Case C-105/15 P, Mallis v. European Commission, EU:C:2016:702;
Case C-8/15 P, Ledra Advertising Ltd v. European Commission, EU:C:2016:701; and Case
C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte v. BPN, EU:C:2013:149; Case C-64/16,
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, EU:C:2018:117.
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euro-crisis. It might be that the EU judges thought it was inappropriate to
deliver far-reaching declarations on such an important and politically charged
topic.The second concerns the structure of the case and the arguments brought
forward to support the grounds for review in the case. A number of arguments
that might have obliged the ECJ to take a stance on the definition and legal
importance of solidarity in the EMU were only made at the appeal stage, so
they were dismissed by the ECJ based on the rule that no new arguments can
be brought before the Court in appeal proceedings.82 These include, for
example, the argument that a “haircut” of a Member State’s debt could be
subject to conditions set by the Commission or could be based on Article
136(3) TFEU in conjunction with Article 352 TFEU, and that the Solidarity
Initiative could be partially registered by the Commission. These had to do not
only with the grounds that the appellant put forward for review, but also with
the actual objectives of the proposed Initiative – had the applicant been
consistent all along with their argumentation, the case might have given us
more detailed statements by the ECJ about EMU law and thus a lot more
points to consider.
The inadmissibility of these arguments also meant that the ECJ adopted a
certain understanding of the Solidarity Initiative and worked backwards from
that when assessing the GC’s judgment on the suitability mainly of Articles
122 and 136 TFEU as legal bases for the proposed Initiative. We already
discussed Advocate General Mengozzi’s interpretation of the Initiative’s
purpose, which derived from putting together the organizer’s initial proposal,
the arguments in the case before the GC, and the arguments for review of the
case by the ECJ. By way of contrast, the ECJ interpreted the purpose of the
Initiative based only on the organizer’s initial proposal and the first instance
case, leaving behind the subsequent arguments raised at the appeal. As such,
when reviewing the GC’s judgment, the ECJ understood the proposed
Initiative as suggesting a general and permanent mechanism under the name
of “the principle of necessity” that would allow Greece (or any Member State)
to decide unilaterally not to repay all or part of its debts owed both to the EU
and to other legal or natural public or private persons (including individual
Member States). For example, the ECJ did not consider whether an alternative
interpretation of the proposed Initiative, whereby the haircut of debt would be
subject to conditions set out by the Commission, could have been established
based on Article 122 TFEU.83 This is because the argument on the potential
conditionality for triggering the so-called principle of necessity was only
invoked on appeal.84
82. Judgment, paras. 52–55.
83. Ibid., para 72.
84. Ibid., para 53.
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The word “unilateral” in the Court’s understanding of the proposed
mechanism under the Solidarity Initiative explains why the rejection of the
appeal is not surprising. Financial assistance given to Member States during
the euro-crisis has traditionally been bilateral or multilateral, based on a host
of different mechanisms established after the agreement of EU Member
States.85 Most importantly, it has been conditional on the Member State
fulfilling certain obligations. In the context of the EMU, solidarity has been
considered to operate hand-in-hand with the ideas of reciprocity and
conditionality and not solely as “altruistic solidarity”.86 Financial assistance
was provided to an EU Member State only if the recipient country remained
responsible for its commitments to its creditors, if the assistance was
indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole,
and if the recipient Member State adhered to strict conditionality attached to
the financial aid.87 Based on this rationale, the ECJ would have contradicted
itself if it had ruled in Anagnostakis that a Member State can unilaterally
decide to write off part of its debt to the EU. All the more so, given the
ambiguity in the case as to which creditors would be involved in the provision
of solidarity to Greece.
The word “unilateral” is also key when we consider the broader
implications of the judgment vis-à-vis the government debt haircut in the
Eurozone. Past commentary on the GC’s judgment in Anagnostakis had
characterized the GC’s finding as “politically explosive”.88 This referred to
the statement by the GC that “the adoption of a legislative act authorizing a
Member State not to repay its debt, however, far from constituting economic
policy guidance within the meaning of Article 136(1)(b) TFEU, which is the
provision on which the present complaint is based, would in fact result in
replacing the free will of contracting parties with a legislative mechanism for
the unilateral writing-off of sovereign debt, which is something that the
provision clearly does not authorize”.89 Based on this quote, Sarmiento asks
whether the General Court “openly precluded any kind of haircut of
government debt by any means” which would mean that “haircuts will be
mission impossible in the future despite the circumstances, the consensus
among Member States, and the terms and scope of the haircut”.90
85. Examples include the European Financial Stability Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, and the European Stability Mechanism.
86. Hilpold, “Understanding solidarity within EU law: An analysis of the ‘islands of
solidarity’ with particular regard to monetary union”, 34 YEL (2015), 257 at 265.
87. Case C-370/12, Pringle, paras. 138, 142–147.
88. Sarmiento, op. cit. supra note 60.
89. Case T-450/12, Anagnostakis, para 58.
90. Sarmiento, op. cit. supra note 60.
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Offering a reflection on this question, it is argued here that we should be
careful when drawing conclusions from Anagnostakis regarding debt relief in
the EU. The ECJ’s judgment should be seen in light of the ECJ’s specific
understanding of the proposed Initiative, as described above, and particularly
in light of allowing or preventing a Member State unilaterally to erase part of
its debt. This argument is further supported by the ECJ’s judgment, which
clarifies that it is “the adoption of a measure such as that envisaged by the
proposed ECI at issue” and hence “the proposal to enshrine the principle of the
state of necessity, as conceived by the applicant” that are not authorized under
Article 136(1)(b) TFEU.91
7. Concluding Remarks
Anagnostakiswas the first ECI case to be decided by the GC and on appeal by
the ECJ. It illustrated for the first time the clear admissibility of challenges to
the Commission’s Decisions before the EU Courts; ECI organizers can
challenge the legality of those decisions under Article 263 TFEU, both on
procedural and on substantive grounds. It was the first in a series of
subsequent challenges brought by dispirited Initiative organizers who
disagreed with the Commission’s assessment of their proposals.92 The recent
judgment in Izsák and Dabis93 concludes, for the time being, the litigation on
the admissibility of ECIs.
Whether we will see more ECI cases before the EU Courts in the future
largely depends on the format of the admissibility test included in the New
ECI Regulation and on whether this revised legal framework changes the
current rules of the game. As mentioned above, one of the main changes to the
legal admissibility test is the formal recognition that an ECI can be registered
even when only a part of the Initiative, including its main objectives, does not
manifestly fall outside the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a
legal act for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. Besides the possibility
for partial registration, the essence of the current admissibility test under
Article 4(2)(b), and thus its interpretation by the EU Courts, remains the same.
91. Judgment, paras. 91–92.
92. In addition to Anagnostakis, overall the following ECI cases reached the EU Courts:
Case T-754/14, Efler and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2017:323; Case T-44/14, Costantini
and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2016:223; Case T-646/13,Minority SafePack v.Commission,
EU:T:2017:59; Case T-361/14, AHB and Others v. Commission, EU:T:2017:252 (appealed in
C-336/17 P,HB and Others v.Commission, EU:C:2018:74); Case C-420/16 P, Izsák and Dabis.
For a discussion see Karatzia, op. cit. supra note 7.
93. Case C-420/16 P, Izsák and Dabis.
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In terms of substance, it was shown that in Anagnostakis the ECJ took a
rather minimalist approach, disregarding the alternative explanations of the
proposed Initiative put forward by the appellant, and eventually dismissed the
case. By way of contrast, the more recent case of Izsák and Dabis, illustrates
that the ECJ (on appeal) has the possibility to give final judgment in such ECI
cases. Following a different line of argumentation from Anagnostakis, Izsák
and Dabis had challenged the Commission’s interpretation of Article 4(2)(b)
and Article 11(4) TFEU as to the Commission’s power to refuse registration
of a proposed Initiative on the grounds of lack of competence: the ECJ ruled
that the Commission had infringed Article 4(2)(b) of the ECI Regulation by
refusing to register a proposed Initiative.
A final thought about Anagnostakis is triggered by recent events
concerning the Greek debt, which make one wonder whether the ECJ’s
approach would have been different had the Solidarity Initiative been
presented as a suggestion for debt relief that was coupled with conditionality
and not coming unilaterally from a troubled Member State. In 2018, Greece
exited its bailout programme. The exit came after an agreement during a
Eurogroup meeting to provide Greece with debt relief measures subject to
compliance with policy commitments and monitoring. In this sense, debt
relief includes a deferral of the European Financial Stability Framework
(EFSF) interest and amortization by 10 years and an extension of the
maximum weighted average maturity by 10 years, both of which stretch the
EFSF grace period to 2032. The Eurogroup expressed its willingness to revise
this grace period with a view to agreeing on additional debt measures, on
condition that the EU fiscal framework is respected.94 It seems, therefore, that
some sort of debt relief was eventually agreed for Greece although, contrary
to the proposals of the Solidarity Initiative, it is certainly not unilateral and not
unconditional.
Anastasia Karatzia*
94. Eurogroup statement on Greece of 22 June 2018, <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2018/06/22/eurogroup-statement-on-greece-22-june-2018/>.
* Lecturer, School of Law, University of Essex.
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